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NOTE
Labeling Imported Articles With
Country of Origin
articles into the United States are faced
with a myriad of customs and Federal Trade Commission regulations before the particular articles can be distributed throughout the
United States for further manufacture or for direct sale and consumption. One regulatory area concerns the requirement of labeling imported products with the name of the country of origin.
Pertinent to this requirement are not only customs laws and the
regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission under
its rules against unfair trade practices, but also certain trademark
laws embodied in the Lanham Act.' As a consequence, the importer bears the heavy burden of compliance with all the existing
laws and regulations on marking the country of origin. His task
sometimes requires compliance with specific regulations which may
be contradictory and mutually incompatible in their application. It is
the purpose of this note to survey the legal and regulatory approaches which govern the problem of marking the country of origin.
MPORTERS OF FOREIGN

I.

CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS

Basic policy considerations underlying customs regulation and
marking standards are embodied in Title 19 of the United States
Code, section 1304 (1964). Specifically, subsection (a) puts forth
the following standard as a guideline for an importer of goods of
foreign origin:
Every article of foreign origin . . .imported into the United States

shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly and
permanently as the nature of the article . . .will permit in such

manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States
2

the English name of the country of origin of the article.

From the legislative background of the statute, it appears that Congress employed the language quoted above to accomplish one specific purpose: to protect an "ultimate purchaser" in the United
1 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1964).
4
2 19 U.S.C. § 130 (a) (1964).
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States from unwittingly buying goods of foreign origin.3 The courts
have tended to follow this approach and have said that proper marking of goods may provide a basis of selection between available
goods of comparable quality of both foreign and domestic origin.4
To effectuate its purposes, Congress vested power in the Secretary of the Treasury5 to promulgate regulations' specifying the sufficiency of the labeling on imports7 in order to prevent deception as
to the article's origin." In addition, the Secretary may authorize
certain classes of goods to be exempted from the statute. 9 Among
those articles excepted from general marking requirements are
goods incapable of being marked;' ° goods which cannot be marked
without injury prior to importation;" goods which cannot be labeled before importation due to prohibitive expense of marking;"
crude substances; 18 goods to be used by the importer alone and not
to be sold;' 4 articles intended to be processed or combined by the
purchaser such that the marking would be "obliterated, destroyed,
or permanently concealed" by such process;' 5 goods which by their
very nature would indicate their origin without any marking; 16 any
article produced at least 20 years prior to its importation into the
United States;'7 goods which had been imported in "substantial
quantities" without marking during the period from January 1,
1932, to January 1, 1937;"' and goods inadvertently unmarked at
the time of their importation which cannot properly be marked in
the United States without prohibitive expense.' 9
3 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2283, 2288. See also United States v. Ury,
106 F.2d 28 (2d Cit. 1939).
4 United States v. Ury, 106 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Friedlaender
& Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 297 (Cust. 1940); United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., 27
C.C.P.A. 267 (Cust. 1940).
519 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1964).
6 These regulations are collected in 19 C.F.R. § 11.8 (1968).
7 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (1964).
8M, § 130 4 (a)(2) (1964).
91d, § 130 4 (a)(3) (1964).
10Id. § 1304(a)(A) (1964).
11Id. § 1304(a)(3)(B) (1964).
121d. § 1304(a)(3)(C) (1964).
Is1d. § 1304(a)(3)(E) (1964).
14 ld. § 1304(a)(3)(F) (1964).

15Id. §
161d. §
17Id. §
18Id. §
19d. §

1304(a)(3)(G) (1964).
1304(a)(3)(H) (1964).
1304(a)(3)(I) (1964).
1304(a)(1)(J) (1964).
1304(a) (1) (K) (1964).
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In order to cope with some of these exceptions, Congress provided that goods normally imported in a container must have an indication of the country of origin on the container.2 ° Again, the intent is to protect the ultimate purchaser of the goods and to assist
him in selecting materials for his use. 2
Certain sanctions are prescribed to insure compliance with the
statute.2 2 These include requiring the importer to mark the country

of origin after importation of the product to the United States;28
deportation of the goods;2 4 the levying of a 10 percent ad valorem

duty assessed at the time of importation; 25 and retention of the unmarked goods in customs until they are properly marked or the increased duty is paid.26
As noted above, the Secretary of the Treasury has issued explanatory regulations to provide detailed guidelines on marking and
labeling.27 For example, section 11.8(a) 28 of the customs regulations provides that the country of origin "shall .. .mean the political entity known as a nation."2 9 This same section requires that
the terms "MADE IN," "PRODUCT OF," or other phrases of similar import precede the designation of the country in which the
product was manufactured or produced, and that the lettering of
these terms be at least comparable in size with the country's name.8"
The terminology used would seem to apply only to goods imported
201 d. § 1304(b) (1964). Presumably, this section was included to deal specifically
with the goods excepted from marking under 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(D) (1964).
21 Id. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
22 19 U.S.C. § 1304(c) (1964) (sanctions not considered to be penal in nature). Criminal provisions are included in subsection (d) and include a fine up to
$5,000 and imprisonment of up to one year if an intent to conceal information of
country of origin can be shown. But see United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960),
where the Supreme Court did not find a violation of section 1304 in spite of the fact
that an intent to conceal the origin of the goods was clearly shown.
4
28 19 U.S.C. § 130 (c) (1964).
24 Id.
25 Id. Such duty is unavoidable and in addition to any other duty imposed by law
whether or not the goods themselves are "exempt from the payment of ordinary customs duties."
26 19 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (1964). This subsection also states that section 1304 does
not abrogate "particular requirements of marking provided for in any other provision
of law," some of which are more strict and pervasive than section 1304. See, e.g., 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (1964) (unfair practices in the import trade).
27 See note 6 supra. It should be noted that these regulations have the force of law.
See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960).
28 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(a) (1968).
29 Id. See United States v. Friedlaender & Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 297 (Cust. 1940)
(product made in Czechoslovakia, then under German control).
80 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(a) (1968).
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for resale without subsequent processing, manufacturing, combining, etc. While it has been held that the name of the country of
origin must be in legible English,"l the foregoing requirements are
not so stilted that obvious variations in the country name are altogether precluded. The adjectival of the name of an origin country
is acceptable as a proper indication of that country,82 provided the
adjectival form is not used in conjunction with other wording so as
to refer to a type or species of product.8 Moreover the spelling of
the name of the specific country may vary from the exact English
spelling as long as the name is clearly discernible in such varied
form.14 Abbreviations may also be used as long as they clearly and
unambiguously indicate the name of the origin country." Whether

or not specific variations in marking of the English name of the
origin country are to be permitted is noted from time to time in the
Treasury decisions.86
For purposes of the foregoing statute and regulations, the country of manufacture or production is to be considered the country
where the product itself originated. 7 Furthermore, where additional work must be done or material added to the product in another country, the additional work or material must render a substantial transformation of the product in order for the country of
the subsequent alteration and modification to be considered the
country of origin.8 8
81 In Denston Felt & Hair Co. v. United States, 27 C.C.P.A. 282 (Cust. 1940), the
court found that the marking of an article with the words "Product Of U.S.S.R." on
goods imported from the Soviet Union was not in compliance with the statute since the
letters "U.S.S.R." were not legible English words. In this case, the imported merchandise consisted of hair packed in bales imported from Russia. The Collector of Customs
required the marking "Soviet Russia" in lieu of the marking at the time of importation
before releasing the bales from custody. The Collector also assessed the importer the
additional 10 percent ad valorem duty. The court held that the marking must be clear
and unambiguous and that it must do more than merely "hint" at the country of origin.
See also Didia v. United States, 106 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Conner v. United
States, 28 C.C.P.A. 185 (Cust. 1941).
82 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(b) (1968), allowing, as an example, the term "English" per se
as sufficient to show the country of origin.
88 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(b) (1968), noting that "English Shoes" or "French Pastry" are
unacceptable for the purposes intended by the section.
34 Id.
It is stated that "Brasil" may be substituted for "Brazil" or "Italie" for
"Italy." Compare American Burtonizing Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. App. 652
(1926) (use of French terms to mark the origin of the goods held insufficient).
85 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(b) (1968), noting that "Gt. Britain" would be a plausible substitute for "Great Britain."
8619 C.F.R. § 11.8(b) (1968).
87 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(c) (1968). See also text accompanying note 29 supra.
88
ld. See also United States v. Strauss Import Corp., 27 C.C.P.A. 274 (Cust. 1941).
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The Secretary of the Treasury has specified certain goods"9 which
must be marked unambiguously by one of several methods 0 to insure protection for the "ultimate purchaser." Other classes of
goods not further specified by the Secretary may be designated by
"any method of legible and conspicuous marking."'"
In those cases in which an imported product is to be converted
or altered in the United States, there is a minimization of the marking requirement as to the persons who must be notified of the product's origin.42 Those persons who must be informed are the "ultimate purchasers" as defined by the Secretary. Generally stated,
an ultimate purchaser may be defined as "the last person in the
United States who will receive the article in the form in which it
was imported. '4 Thus, in the case of United States v. GibsonThomsen Co. 44 it was held that where an imported article is to be
used in the United States in the manufacture of a product having
a character and use differing from that of the imported article, the
country of origin marking need only be made to notify the manufacturer or processor. 4' According to this principle, the manufacturer or processor in the United States who converts or combines
the imported article will be considered the ultimate purchaser of
that article for the purposes of section 1304.46 The finished product, therefore, will not have to bear any mark of foreign origin.47
The Gibson-Thomsen rule, then, is substantially the same as that
contained in the customs regulations. 48 However, it is difficult to
generalize from this definition to accommodate all situations.
30 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(d) (1968), listing as examples: "Knives, clippers, shears, safety
razors, surgical instruments, etc."
40Id, The regulation specifies "die-stamping, cast-in-the-mold lettering, etching
(acid or electrolytic), engraving, by means of metal plates" as acceptable means of
marking.
41 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(d) (1968).
42 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(e) (1968).
43 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(e) n.6(a) (1968).
44 United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (Cust. 1940).

45Id.
46 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(e) n.6(a) (1968).
47 United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (Cust. 1940), where the
particular imported product, bases for -toothbrushes, was to be utilized in the United
States in the fabrication and assembly of a product having a name, character, and use
differing from that of the imported article. The word "Japan" was die sunk on each
of the toothbrush handles, but the mark became obscured when bristles were inserted.
The court held that the manufacturer in this case was the "ultimate purchaser" of the
handles since their original identity was lost in processing, and that the handles were
indelible and permanently marked in a conspicuous place at the time of importation in
compliance with section 1304.
48 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(e) n.6(a) (1968).
See note 43 supra.
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Clearly, in most cases a manufacturer would be considered the ultimate purchaser; this is particularly true where he converts or combines the imported product into a product of a substantially different character. 9 When the processing or combination does not result in a substantial transformation and the change in the character
of the product is slight, a subsequent buyer becomes the ultimate
purchaser and origin markings must be made to notify him.5 ° In
addition, any products imported for sale at retail must be clearly
marked so that the purchaser can easily discern the true origin."
Despite interpretations of the statute by both the Secretary of
the Treasury and the courts, some very difficult problems remain.
For example, it is still very difficult to ascertain how a given court
will interpret restrictions. This is especially true when subtle distinctions must be drawn, as in the cases of United States v. Strauss
Import Co. 5'2 and United States v. Wolfson.55 The Wolfson decision
involved tubular steel bends that were not individually marked
but the burlap wrapping in which they were shipped was marked
with a label "Made in Scotland." The court held this insufficient
to comply with the labeling requirements since, to comply fully
with the statute, notification would have to reach substantially all
of the ultimate purchasers - not just some of them. 4 Whether
or not this decision follows the Gibson-Thomsen ultimate purchaser
test is somewhat unclear, although it is true that some of the tubing
was to be sold as retail merchandise.55
49 d.
50 d.
51 See United States v. Strauss Import Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 274 (Cust. 1941), the court
found that steel clothes fasteners marked "Japan" at the time of their importation had
become integrated into the clothes product thus losing their identity, and the marking
was sufficient even though the word "Japan" had been obscured in the processing.
52 d. See note 49 supra.
53 United States v. Wolfson, 52 C.C.P.A. 46 (Cust. 1965).
54 Id. It is rather difficult to tell whether this should be considered a more liberal
or a more stringent reading of the labeling restrictions. This query becomes even
more abject when the contrary case of Diamond Match Co. v. United States, 49 C.C.P.A.
52 (Cust. 1962), is considered. There, under basically similar circumstances, the court
held that a marking band holding bundles of unmarked wooden spatulas together was
clearly a sufficient indication of national origin even though the spatulas were resold,
sometimes without any alteration in identity, individually to separate purchasers. The
case seemed to turn on the fact that the bundles would not be broken before being incorporated in another product by some manufacturer.
55 A recent decision in this area which is factually similar to United States v. Wolfson, 52 C.C.P.A. 46 (Cust. 1965), should be noted. In Treas. Dec. 68-57, 33 Fed. Reg.
3193 (1968), unfinished welding fittings and flanges were imported unmarked and
submitted to a finishing process including cleaning, painting, threading the bore, and
drilling bolt holes. The Bureau of Customs here followed Gibson-Thomsen's "ulti-

LABELING IMPORTED ARTICLES

1968]

In spite of the disparity among decisions construing section
1304, it appears that the vital issue in virtually every situation is the
identity of the ultimate purchaser. The primary test is the GibsonThomsen doctrine.56 There are various factors which help determine whether the importer-manufacturer or the consumer is the ultimate purchaser: the nature of the imported product, its labeling
at the time of importation, and the processes employed after its
importation. 57 A careful consideration of these factors will enable
one to distinguish whether a new and different product with a new
name, character, and use has been developed.58
II.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REGULATIONS

The authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to police unfair and deceptive trade practices, including origin marking
requirements, is found in the Federal Trade Commission Act.5"
The authority and jurisdiction of the FTC are independent of the
customs regulations.6 ° Consequently the FTC may act notwithstanding prior decisions concerning the same subject matter under
the customs provisions.6 ' The FTC acts under a general statute empowering it to regulate goods entering interstate commerce, while
the customs statute is of more limited scope.62 Thus, even though
the Tariff Act is intended to protect the ultimate purchaser, this
does not undermine the jurisdiction of the FTC to police unfair
63
trade practices to protect all types of purchasers.
The general grant of authority to the FTC is difficult to define
with precision. The task is further complicated by the myriad of
products which come under this authority. As general rules are
difficult to promulgate, the FTC has recently announced that it
would deal with the problem on an ad hoc basis.64 In the following discussions, then, general analysis of the affirmative requiremate purchaser" test and held that the processor in the United States did not create a
new and different article with a new name, character, or use.
56 See note 47 supra.
57 19 C.F.R. § 11.8(e) n. 6 (a) (1968).
58 See note 35 supra.
59 E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. F.T.C., 77 F.2d 886, 888 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 296
U.S. 617 (1935). See section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1954).
60 L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. F.T.C., 191 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1951).
6
62

L. Heller & Son, Inc., v. F.T.C. 191 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1951).
Baldwin Bracelet Corp. v. F.T.C., 325 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

63

Id.

Advisory Op. Dig. Nos. 206-236, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 18273-18303 (F.T.C.
April 4, 1968); B.N.A. Anti-Trust Advance Sheet (April 9, 1968).
64
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ments for origin marking, and of deceptive and misleading practices of origin labeling can best be undertaken on a case by case
basis.
The catalyst for FTC action is a "public interest" test. 5 The
test involves a balancing of the public preference for goods of domestic origin against preference for items of foreign manufacture.6 6
This rationale was utilized in the case of Baldwin Bracelet Corp. v.
FTC,67 where the court required affirmative disclosure of foreign
origin as being necessary to prevent unfair competition with domestic manufacturers where a preference for domestic goods was discernible.6"
Certain exceptions to the affirmative requirement to disclose foreign origin demonstrate the application of the public interest test.
No disclosure is necessary where a product is not produced domestically since there is no competitive position to protect, nor comparison to be made.6" If because of a price differential there is no discernible preference for a domestic product over a foreign product,
or if the desire for foreign-made articles is greater than for those of
domestic origin, disclosure is not required.7 ° However, the burden
of proof is on the seller to show that there is no public preference
71
for the domestic goods.
The authority of the FTC reaches not only the unfair results of
non-disclosure, but also the use of misleading designations of origin by either domestic or foreign producers. Certainly, where a
product is blatantly advertised as the product of a country other
than that of its true origin, the FTC has no trouble in finding the
practice deceptive.7 2 However, subtle methods have been utilized.
The term "Havana Cigars" when applied to a domestic product is
74
improper and deceptive. 73 Similarly, the use of Chinese symbols
and the phrase "Designed by English bootmakers' 75 were prohibited,
absent further prominent designation of true origin. All of these
65 See Fioret Sales Co. v. F.T.C., 100 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir. 1938).
66
See Establissements Rigand, Inc. v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1942).
67
Baldwin Bracelet Corp. v. F.T.C., 325 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
68d. at 1014.
69 For a full discussion, see 2 TRADE REG. REP. 5 7551.
701d.

71Id.
72 See E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. F.T.C., 77 F.2d 886, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 617 (1935).
73 In re Isadore H. Lukacher, 29 F.T.C. 490, 500-503 (1939).
74 Associated Distributors, Inc., 36 F.T.C. 756, 761-63 (1943).

75 Stipulation 3091, 32 F.T.C. 1710 (1941).
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decisions of the FTC presuppose a general preference for the imported product.7 0
It appears that substance and not form controls the designation
of a product as foreign. A product is not considered "foreignmade" because a foreign formula is used when a domestic corporation does the manufacturing. 77 Also, manufacture by a domestic
subsidiary of a foreign corporation 78 or the supervision of production by foreign directors and shareholders 79 do not qualify for other
than a domestic label. Presumably, when the general approach of
the FTC revolves around the broad preference scale, there are devices and techniques that face blanket prohibition regardless of the
impression of origin sought to be presented. For example, Japanese china represented as "Dubarry Porcelain," to convey the impression of French origin, failed to disclose true origin regardless
of the proper use of the "imported" designation.80
Other case law elucidates the FTC approach to labeling with
country of origin. In Harsam Distributors Inc. v. FTC81 a manufacturer of perfume who combined French essence with domestic
alcohol was denied the label of French perfume. Here the concern
was for "the protection of the public, not experts" because it was
standard industry practice to label the product as imported. 82 The
label "Australian Wool" was considered misleading in Federal
Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co.,88 because the product
was not wholly composed of Australian wool.8 4 It is apparent that
the scope of FTC authority encompasses' accuracy in disclosure as
well as the requirement of affirmative disclosure to prevent unfair
and deceptive practices.
Another problem area is the combining of a foreign component
or components with domestic components. Here the question concerns not only the duty to label a product as being of foreign origin,
but also the right to represent a product as being "Made in U.S.A."
Again the public interest test is pertinent. However, in one case
76 See Fioret Sales Co. v. F.T.C., 100 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir. 1938).
77
La Sasine International, Inc., 14 F.T.C. 353 (1931).
78See Yardley of London, Inc., 30 F.T.C. 156, 157 (1939).
See also In re Philip
Morris & Co., 32 F.T.C. 278 (1940).
79 See Establissements Rigand, Inc. v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1942).
80 Edward P. Paul & Co. v. F.T.C., 169 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
81 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959).
82 Id. at 398.
88 388 U.S. 483 (1922).
84

Id.
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the use of imported needles in an otherwise domestically manufactured phonograph did not require disclosure. 85 Nor was the fact
that imported glass beads formed the cores of domestically produced pearl necklaces required to be revealed to the consumer.86
From these cases a test much like that previously discussed concerning Gibson-Thomsen seems to emerge, 87 namely, when a component is significantly altered or is not a substantial component of the
final product, no disclosure is required.
On the other hand, the absence of the requirement for affirmative disclosure does not appear to be license to represent the product as "Made in U.S.A." Recently, the FTC has approached such
a designation as an affirmative representation that the product was
made entirely in the United States.88 "Assembled in U.S.A." or
something similar which discloses the presence of foreign component parts is permitted.8 9 Compiling a body of specific rules and
conclusions on origin labeling is not a straightforward task. There
are acts of omission and acts of commission, and lying between
these are a multitude of fact situations which do not easily lend
themselves to solution within the framework of the present laws.
However, it may be helpful to present a brief summary of those
laws and decisions which have been discussed.
As has been stated, FTC jurisdiction is independent of the customs laws. The approach taken by the FTC toward origin marking is based on the concept of preventing unfair and deceptive
trade practices. These practices are examined in the light of the
public interest or preference test. Generally, a product manufactured totally abroad must be designated with its country of origin.
If two or more foreign countries participate, then the name of the
country supplying the most substantial contribution should appear.
If the countries contribute equally, then all names should appear.
It is deceptive to label a domestic product as imported, or an imported one as domestic. In addition, a marking which creates an
inference of improper origin through a lack of proper explanation,
is deceptive and therefore prohibited. The designation "Made in
U.S.A." is reserved for products exclusively of domestic origin, at852 TRADE REG. REP. 5 7551.12; see Waltham Watch Co. v. F.T.C., 318 F.2d 28
(7th Cir. 1963).
86 L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. F.T.C., 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951).
87 See
88

text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.

Advisory Op. Dig. Nos. 206-236, 3
April 4, 1968).
89 Id.

TRADE

I
REG. REP. 5 18273-18303 (F.T.C.
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though goods of mixed foreign and domestic components may use
the "Assembled in U.S.A." designation. When such mixed products are manufactured, there seems to be no requirement to disclose the origin of components if such components are not a substantial part of the final product or lose their original identity in
the manufacturing process.
III.

TRADEMARK LAW

The function of a trademark is to indicate the origin of a productY0 However, geographical designations are generally not the
proper subject matter for a trademark."' Therefore, in the trademark area origin marking is quite a different thing from the customs regulations and unfair trade practices areas previously discussed. A particular product could be manufactured in any country and properly bear the same trademark. Certain products may
become associated with specific countries and geographical areas.
The hood ornaments of the Rolls Royce and Mercedes Benz are examples of marks which are quickly associated with England and
West Germany, respectively. For this reason, one could easily deceive a purchaser as to the country of origin of a product by the
manipulation of a trademark.
Because of the unfair competitive advantages which may be
gained through the use of a deceptive trademark, the Lanham Act
or Trademark Act of 1946 was promulgated. 2 Two sections apply
specifically to problems related to foreign goods entering this country. Section 42 provides in part that:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall ... bear a name
or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is
manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in
any foreign country or locality other than the country or locality
in which it is in fact manufactured shall be admitted to entry at
any custom house in the United States . . .3

Section 43 (a) provides that:
[A]ny person who shall affix, apply, annex, or use in connection
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for
90 Old Charter Distillery Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 174 F. Supp. 312, 330
(D.C. Del. 1959).
91 Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901); Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460 (1893); Brown Chemical Co. v. Meger, 139
U.S. 540 (1890).
92 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
93 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1964).
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goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil action
by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as
that of the origin or in the region in which said locality is situated,
or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be 4damaged
by the use of any such false description or representationY

Section 43(b) prohibits the importation of goods into the United
States bearing misrepresentative marks. 5
The sections which forbid any false designation of origin and
false descriptions have created a new federal statutory tort sui generis and are not considered to be a mere codification of existing
common law principles of unfair competition.9 6 These sections
have been held to apply exclusively to false descriptions or representations which are of substantially the same economic importance
as those involving infringement or other improper trademark usages.9
It was not the intention of the drafters of the statute to
create windfalls, but rather to promote fair and honest competitive dealing.9
However, there is a close relationship between customs law and
the Lanham Act. According to section 11.14 of the customs regulations, 9 the importation of merchandise of foreign or domestic
manufacture is prohibited if such merchandise bears a mark or
name which copies or substantially duplicates a trademark or
trade name recorded in the Treasury Department under provisions
of the Lanham Act. An exception is made for merchandise which
is imported by, or for the account of, or with the written consent
of, the owner of the protected trademark or trade name.'
The essence of any proceeding brought under section 43 of the
Lanham Act is false description, or representation, or use of a particular trademark which is likely to cause confusion to the average
purchaser.' 01 While most cases under section 43 have been di94

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964).

95
96

15 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1964).

See Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155
(1959).
9 See Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, 87 F. Supp. 218 (D.C. Mass. 1949),

aff'd 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
98 Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).

99 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1968).
100 Id.
101 Societ6 Comptoir De L'Industrie Cotonniere Establissements Boussac v. Alex-

ander's Dept. Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).

However, it is not harm to

the purchaser which is of paramount importance, but rather harm to competitors.
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rected at attempts to "pass off" one's product as that of another by
improper trademark usage, there can be cases where the problem is
directly concerned with geographical origin.10 2 Such problems arise
out of situations like that in Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou
Nierenberg Corp., where the furs bore the trademark of "Canadian Fur Corporation" but were not in fact from Canada.'
Although the Lanham Act is not the only statute relating to labeling in the form of trademarks,0 4 it is a warning that an importer
must be as careful in the marks which indicate the identity of the
producer as with those which indicate the product's country of origin.
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS LAWS WHICH IMPOSE SPECIFIC

REQUIREMENTS FOR LABELING COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

There are certain other statutes in addition to those already discussed which contain requirements pertinent to labeling for country of origin. These statutes apply to particular types of goods
such as foods and drugs, textiles, and furs. The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act contains provisions setting forth requirements for branding and labeling packages containing foodstuffs,
drugs, and related products. 0 5 The Act specifically provides that
all packages containing food must be marked with the name and
place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor.' 0 0 If
such marks are not present, the food packages will be deemed mis07
labeled.
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act,10 8 which is administered by the Federal Trade Commission, provides that in the
case of imported textile products covered under the Act the name
of the country where the product was processed or manufactured
102 Federal-Mogul Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 201 F. Supp. 788 (D.C. Ohio

1962).
103 See Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp. 23 F.R.D. 155
(1959).
104 Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the importation of any item
which bears a trademark which is owned by a citizen of the United States. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526 (1964). See 4 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §
100.1 (2d ed. 1950), for a discussion of the relationship between section 526 of the
Tariff Act and sections 42 and 43 of the Lanahm Act. See also Dam, Trademarks,
Price Discriminationand the Bureau of Customs, 7 J. LAW & ECON. 45 (1964).
10521 U.S.C. § 343 (1964).
106 Id.

107 Id.
108 15 U.S.C. § 70 (1964).
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shall appear on or be affixed to the product in some manner. 10 9 If
the required information is not appended to the product as required, it is considered mislabeled and constitutes an unfair method
of competition.'1 " Moreover, all such imported textile products
which are not properly labeled may be excluded from importation. 1 '
The Fur Products Labeling Act" 2 provides that a fur product
is considered misbranded if there is no label affixed to the product
showing, in addition to other required information, the country of
origin of the fur product."' Thus, passing off domestic furs as imported furs has been held to be an unfair trade practice;" 4 similarly, passing off imported furs as domestic furs has been prohibited." 5 An importer found to be in violation of this Act can be
prohibited from importing into the United States, except upon payment of a bond for double the value of the products being imported." 16
V.

STATUTORY RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE

It is an elusive task to draw definitive guidelines for an importer's course of action. This conclusion is supported by the large
number of FTC advisory opinions sought by manufacturers and
importers over the past few years. Such a case by case approach
is undesirable from the point of view of the individual interests involved.
One recommendation might be that the Lanham Act be amended
to include a statutory provision encompassing all the pertinent country of origin marking rules, opinions, and regulations, in order to
provide a concise and straightforward codification in this problem
area. Any such statutory amendment should leave intact the present
109 15 U.S.C. § 70(b) (1964). In a recent advisory opinion the Federal Trade
Commission stated, citing the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, that disclosure
of foreign origin is required where clothing apparel was assembled and sewn in a foreign country, even though its components, including fabrics, buttons, and trimmings
were of domestic origin. Advisory Op. Dig. No. 206, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18273
(F.T.C. April 4, 1968).
110 15 U.S.C. § 70(a) (1964).
Ill 15 U.S.C. § 70(g) (1964).
112 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1964).
11 15 U.S.C. § 69(b) (1964). See also 16 C.F.R. 301.17 (1968).
4
11 See 16 C.F.R. 301.18 (1968).
115 F.T.C. Complaints No. 7884, 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 24620; F.T.C. Complaints
No. 8404, 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 24655.
116 15 U.S.C. § 69(b) (1964).
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substance of section 1304 of Title 19, as well as the trademark
statutes discussed above.
The proposed amendment could read as follows:
A. Any product manufactured, assembled, constructed, or otherwise fabricated within the United States, its possessions, or territories, and which is comprised in whole or in part of components or
materials manufactured outside the United States, its territories, or
possessions, shall not be labeled or in any way marked thereon
with any wording or any other indication which would in any way
represent to a purchaser of that product that it was manufactured
wholly in the United States, its territories, or possessions. The
foregoing marking restrictions shall also apply to any container,
package, or covering in which such product is inserted for sale, delivery, or storage purposes.
B. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if a product is assembled, constructed, or fabricated within the United States, its territories or possessions, utilizing in part foreign components or materials, such product may be labeled or marked with wording to indicate that it was assembled, constructed, or fabricated in the United States providing that, in language equally conspicuous, it is also
indicated that such product is assembled, fabricated, or constructed
with components of specifically designatedorigin.
C. Any product which is manufactured, fabricated, constructed,
or assembled in the United States utilizing in part or in whole components, materials, services, or labor which originate outside the
United States or its territories or possessions, where the cost value
of such components, materials, services, or labor incorporated therein exceeds 40 percent of the final cost value of the product, shall
be labeled in a clear and conspicuous manner on the external surface thereof showing the country of origin of each such component, part, or materials, or designating the percentage of foreignorigin goods, whichever is most economically feasible, as well as
indicating any specific foreign labor content. The foregoing provisions shall apply irrespective of whether any foreign component
loses its identity in the final product or whether the foreign component be not discernible from any exterior portion of the final
product.
D. Any product which is assembled, manufactured, constructed,
or fabricated within the United States, shall not be marked or labeled in any manner to represent that the product is made outside
the United States.
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E. Nothing in the foregoing statutory provisions shall be construed to supersede or repeal any provisions of Title 19 relative to
customs laws, any provisions of Title 15 relative to trademark usage, or any other provisions of the United States Code.
This amendment should be added to Title 15 of the United
States Code to follow section 1125 and be denoted as 15 U.S.C.
1125(a).
The recommended amendment is centered mainly upon the various rules and opinions promulgated by the FTC under the banner of unfair trade practice concepts. The authors believe that this
area has been plagued by great confusion; for this reason, the foregoing recommendations warrant due consideration.
GRR*/DJR/RAS
* This Note is based on a paper submitted for Professor F.L. Hartman's International
Business Transactions course at CWRU Law School by George R. Royer. Mr. Royer
(B.S., College of William and Mary; M.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; J.D., University of Toledo) is a graduate student at CWRU Law School and an L.L.M. candidate.

